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The influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the 
context of optimal labor contracts. Responses of contract terms to changes in economic 
parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract, the degree of 
workers’ risk aversion, and the resolution of bargaining conflict. Layoffs are not necessarily 
reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the UI benefit. Product demand 
fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation. An 
implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government 
intervention in UI provision. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we examine the determinants of unemployment in the 
microeconomic context of labor contracts. The contracts considered are those 
between an individual firm and its pool of attached workers, in an 
environment of uncertainty about the product demand conditions that will 
prevail. The basis for the analysis will be the ‘implicit contract’ framework 
developed in papers by Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974, 1977), Feldstein (1976) 
and Gordon (1974), among others. [See Azariadis (1979) for a survey and 
references.] In this context wages, and possibly a broader set of job-related 
conditions, are agreed upon in the knowledge that some fraction of the 
workers may be laid off during periods of depressed demand for the firm’s 
product. The expectation of both the firm and these workers, however, is that 
such layoffs will be temporary in nature and that laid-off workers will 
subsequently be rehired when demand improves sufficiently. The firm’s labor 
force is viewed as attached in the sense that the occasional spells of 
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unemployment are brief enough, and the probability of rehire great enough, 
that a laid-off worker does not have an incentive to seek employment with 
another firm. The unemployment being considered is therefore the 
‘temporary layoff unemployment which, in the United States, accounts for a 
significant fraction of observed unemployment, as much as 75 percent of all 
layoffs in manufacturing. [See, for example, Feldstein (1976) for evidence of 
the empirical importance of temporary layoffs in the United States.] 
Our particular focus is the influence of unemployment insurance (UI) on 
the structure of optimal contracts and hence on the pattern of wages and 
layoffs. We are concerned with the manner in which the parameters of the 
UI system condition the response of wages and layoffs to changes in the 
economic environment and with the response to changes in the UI 
parameters themselves. The relevance of UI has been recognized informally 
in most analyses of labor contracts, and has been treated formally in implicit 
contract models by Baily (1977) and Feldstein (1976). At one level, our 
analysis can be compared most directly with the latter. We model the UI 
system in the same way as Feldstein, but depart from him in the treatment of 
workers’ attitude towards risk-bearing and their access to capital markets. 
This distinction is found to have consequences for the validity of Feldstein’s 
conclusions. 
At a more general level, our analysis differs from antecedents in regarding 
the actual contract as being selected from among the set of optimal contracts 
by some bargaining process.’ In Feldstein (1976) for instance, the response 
of the contract is restricted by maintaining the constraint of a given expected 
profit level for the firm, against which workers’ expected utility is to be 
maximized. Any gain or loss resulting from a change in the economic 
environment thus accrues solely to the workers. In Baily (1977) and Azariadis 
(1975), by contrast, the contract is determined by the maximization of 
expected profit for the firm while maintaining a given expected utility level 
for the workers. Any gain or loss then accrues solely to the firm. In order to 
remain agnostic with respect to the details of the bargaining process and its 
solution, we consider both of the polar cases just described. If the optimal 
responses of any particular variable in the contract are qualitatively the same 
in the two cases, there is no ambiguity with respect to the nature of the final 
outcome. However, if the desired directions of response are different, as we 
show may indeed be the case, even the qualitative outcome of the conflict 
will be sensitive to the bargaining process. 
In the course of the analysis we shall have occasion to compare the 
‘In a paper published since this was written, McDonald and Solow (1981) adopt a similar 
approach in a related context. In particular, they examine several alternative explicit bargaining 
solutions for labor contracts in an environment with no uncertainty. Although their emphasis 
and context differ from those here, there are some structural similarities and, to the extent that 
the analyses overlap in focus, the conclusions are mutually supportive, as noted below. 
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implications of a UI system whose structure is exogenous to the firm with 
those of an endogenous, or private, UI scheme. This will suggest, among 
other things, an explanation of why one might expect to observe a 
government-administered system rather than the apparently more efficient 
private arrangement. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we comment briefly on the 
nature and role of the UI system prevalent in the United States. In section 3 
we set out the decision problems of the firm and workers, and characterize 
the set of optimal contracts. The responses of optimal contracts to changes in 
the economic environment are analyzed in section 4. Results are summarized 
in section 5 and an appendix provides mathematical details of the analysis. 
2. Unemployment insurance 
Provided that workers have accumulated sufficient assets and have access 
to a perfect capital market they can, without penalty, modify their income 
stream to achieve the desired profile over any given period of time. Their 
consumption stream can thus be smoothed so that at any time it will depend 
on the average combined receipts of wages and unemployment benefits over 
the period, but not on the current state of employment. This is an important 
premise of Feldstein’s (1976) analysis. However, to the extent that workers 
who frequently experience unemployment have relatively few assets and, 
when employed, earn relatively low wages, they may well find borrowing 
both difficult and costly. In this case unemployment insurance may perform 
an important role in the smoothing of consumption streams, thus alleviating 
economic hardship resulting from loss of income during periods of 
unemployment. Such was the primary goal expressed for the UI system on 
its introduction in the United States. Indeed, if the imperfections in the UI 
system that have been emphasized by Feldstein were eliminated, it is not 
clear what other role would formally justify its existence. 
In this paper we wish to highlight the insurance role of the UI system. To 
do so, we make the assumption that workers are unable to borrow or save. 
The extreme form of this assumption is adopted for simplicity. What is 
essential is an imperfection in the capital market that makes borrowing and 
lending less costly for firms than for workers. 
The UI system in the United States has two main elements: the payments 
to eligible unemployed workers and the financing of these payments. The 
latter is done through a payroll tax on firms, with the majority of states 
using a ‘reserve ratio’ formula. [See Becker (1972) for a detailed description 
of the many variants of the system used in different states.] According to this 
method, a firm has a UI account with the state which is credited with its tax 
payments and debited for the benefits paid to its laid-off workers. The rate at 
which the firm is taxed in a given period is negatively related to its reserve 
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ratio at the beginning of the period, the ratio of its initial UI balance to its 
taxable payroll. This dependence of the UI tax on the firm’s layoff 
performance is referred to as ‘experience rating’. In general, this experience 
rating is imperfect, in the sense that a firm is usually not liable for the exact 
amount of the UI benefit payments to its ex-employees; i.e. there may be a 
chronic tendency for a firm’s UI balance to grow or decline. 
We follow Feldstein (1976) in describing the taxes that result from a firm’s 
layoffs during a period as eB + 7; where e (Ose 5 1) is a constant parameter 
that reflects the firm’s experience rating, B is the amount of benefits paid out 
to laid-off employees during the period, and T is a constant parameter 
representing taxes paid at a flat rate when the firm has reached the 
exogenously specified upper or lower limit of the range of tax rates. If b is 
the UI benefit per period for an eligible unemployed worker and 1 is the 
number of workers laid off for the period, then B=bl and the UI tax 
payment is ebl+ 7: This tax function is derived from a consideration of 
periodic tax payments in a steady state of layoffs. The more imperfect is a 
firm’s experience rating (the smaller is e), the slower will be the adjustment to 
the new steady-state reserve ratio following a change in the layoff rate. 
During the transition from one steady state to another, the firm is less than 
exactly liable for the benefits paid to its laid-off workers. This subsidization 
of the firm’s layoffs when e< 1 is captured in the variable term of the tax 
function. 
3. Optimal contracts 
The environment we consider for the labor contract is essentially that 
described by Azariadis (1975). Throughout the analysis, all rates of flow refer 
to a given period (say a month or year). 
The firm is a price taker in the market for its output. A large 
homogeneous group of workers are attached to this firm in the sense that 
they perceive the firm as being their employer, although it does not always 
employ them all. Without loss of generality, we let the number of workers in 
this group be 1. Frictions in the labor market are such that, in the short run 
at least, the firm only employs workers from this group, and workers in the 
group have no alternative employment opportunities. The price per unit of 
the firm’s output during the next period is uncertain. It is believed that one 
of two states will occur; in state i (i=O, l), assigned probability li, the price 
will be pi, with pO>pl and &+i,=l. 
The workers and the firm are to negotiate a contract for the next period, 
before the state of demand is known. This contract will be represented by a 
vector of real numbers (y,, y,, q,,, qi, b), where yi is the wage (income per 
period) paid to an employed worker in state i, qi is thetnumber of workers 
employed in state i, and b (as above) is the UI payment to an unemployed 
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worker. The general price level is assumed to be stable, so that specification 
of the money wage is equivalent to specification of the real wage. If layoffs 
are randomly selected in any state with unemployment, (1 -qi) can be 
interpreted as the probability that a representative worker will be laid off in 
state i. If the UI system is exogenously specified; then b will be a parameter 
in the contract. It will be important, however, to know the nature of 
contracts in which b is a choice variable, as when the firm provides UI 
privately to its work force. For simplicity, we assume that the number of 
hours, h, worked by an employed worker is fixed. 
A worker’s utility for the period is a function of the net income received 
and of the hours worked. This utility function, u, is assumed to be 
differentiable, concave, strictly increasing in income and strictly decreasing in 
hours worked, so that u,(.)>O, u,(.)<O, u,,(.)IO, u,,(.)50, and 
u,,(.)u,,(.)-u:~(.)~O. It is assumed that labor income is taxed at a constant 
rate t while, as in the United States, UI payments are untaxed. So the utility 
of a worker who earns income y for h hours work is u(( 1 - t)y, h), and that of 
an unemployed worker is u(b, 0). A worker’s expected utility from a contract 
(Y,,, Y,, qo, ql, b) is thus 
U(YOYYI,~O,‘II,~)= 2 ~iCqt~((l-t)Yi~h)+(l-qi)~(b,O)l. i=O 
Let G(q) denote the firm’s output when q workers are employed. It will be 
assumed that G(.) is differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, 
with G’(0) = co. The firm’s expected profit from the contract (yo, y,, qo, ql, b) 
is then 
n(Y~,Yl,qo,ql,b)= i ~iCpiG(qi)-Yiqi-eeb(l-qi)-Tl. 
i=O 
A contract is optimal if no adjustment in its terms can increase the 
expected utility of a worker without decreasing the expected profit for the 
firm, and vice versa. The set of optimal contracts will be further constrained 
by having to provide a minimal level of expected utility to workers and a 
minimal level of expected profit for the firm. For example, workers will have 
no interest in a contract unless expected utility is at least as great as the 
utility expected from alternative employment opportunities, and the firm will 
want at least zero expected profit. There will in general be infinitely many 
contracts that are optimal in this way. Which contract is ultimately settled 
upon will then also reflect the relative bargaining strengths of workers and 
firm. 
Regardless of the bargaining procedure, an optimal contract will be 
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characterized by a pair (U*, n*) such that: 
U*= max U(Y,Y Yl, 409 41, b) 
(Y Y 34 0 .4 0'1 1 1 
subject to (4 W,,Y,, qo,ql, 42n* 
(3) 
and (ii) 1-q,zO, i=o, 1, 
and 
IT*= max WY,> Yl, 90~41~ b) 
(Yo.Y1*40.41) 
subject to 6) WJ~,Y~,Y~,~~, b)ZU* 
and (ii) 1-q,zO, i=O, 1. (4) 
The set of optimal contracts, and hence the (U*, n*) combinations, will be 
affected by a change in any of the environmental parameters: pi, t, e, b or 7: 
It will be convenient to characterize the optimal contract decisions first 
taking b as a choice variable. The corresponding necessary condition can 
then be discarded for situations in which b is parametric. If the case with b 
variable is to be interpreted as that of a purely private UI scheme, it will be 
required also that e= 1 and T=O. Furthermore, in that situation, UI benefits 
would be subject to the same tax as wage income. Although we shall not 
modify the formal statement of the problem by introducing another tax 
parameter to cover this latter point, the interpretation of. first-order 
conditions must be made with this in mind. 
Consider first the problem, (3), of maximizing the expected utility of the 
representative worker, subject to the constraint of an expected protit level, 
IT*, to be achieved by the firm. (This is the problem considered by Feldstein, 
who takes 3(i) to hold as an equality, with 17* = 0, on the basis of competitive 
behavior.) 
Corresponding to (3) is the Lagrangian 
2~ i niCqiu((l-t)Yi,h)+(l-qi)u(b,O)] 
i=O 
I? ‘iCPiG(qi)-yiqi_eb(l_qi)-_]-17* i=O 
+ iio yli(l- 4ii 
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Since we shall be concerned only with nontrivial contracts, in which both 
wage and employment are strictly positive in each state, and since the profit 
constraint will be binding, the necessary conditions for a solution to (3) can 
be written: 
(5a) 
Z;pqi=Izi[~((l -t)yi, h)-~(b, 0)] +pii[piG’(qi)- yyi + eb] -T/~=O; i=O, 1, 
(5b) 
b 2 0; 9b = $J li( 1 - qi)u,(b, 0) -p i lie( 1 - qi) 5 0; bLfb = 0, (54 
i=O i=O 
9~= i ;liCPiG(qi)-yyiqi-eb(l-qi)-T]-n*=O, 
i=O 
The necessary conditions for a solution to the firm’s problem (4) are, with 
a relabeling of multipliers, the same as those for the dual problem (3), except 
that the expected profit constraint (5d) is replaced by the expected utility 
constraint: 
,f ili[qiU(( 1 - t)yi, h) +(l - qi)u(b, 0)] = U*. 
i=O 
It follows from (5a) that u,((l -t)y,, h)=u;((l - t)yl, h). If workers are risk 
averse (ull ~0) an optimal contract must therefore have the fixed wage 
property, y, =y,. However, even if workers are risk neutral (ull =O), if there 
exists an optimal contract then there exists one with the fixed wage property. 
So we shall henceforth assume that optimal contracts have this property, and 
let y denote the fixed wage. 
Since pO>pl by assumption, it follows from (5b) and (5~) that q,,zql. 
Furthermore, if there are layoffs in state 1, the number of layoffs will be 
greater than in state 0, i.e. O<q, < 1 implies q. >ql. From now on we shall 
confine our attention to solutions with q. = 1 and O<q, < 1. Consequently, if 
b is parametric, we may characterize contracts by the pair (ql, y) and depict 
problems (3) and (4) in a ql-y diagram. 
Given that y> 0, it can be shown that if b is a choice variable it will be 
positive provided ~~~50, i.e. if marginal utility of income increases with 
leisure or is independent of leisure. Even if uiZ >O, it may be the case that 
b>O. Assuming then that b>O, (5~) implies, using (5a): 
u,(b,O)-e(l-t)u,((l-t)y,h)=O. (7) 
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In the particular case where the firm is fully experience rated (e= l), we see 
that an optimal contract will have a wage and UI payment such that the 
marginal utility of income whev employed equals that when unemployed. 
(Recall that b would be taxed as regular income if this were a private UI 
scheme.) This condition is familiar from the economic literature on insurance 
markets. 
It will be useful to have a geometric picture of the dual contract problems 
(3) and (4), taking b as a parameter. The family of curves of constant 
expected profit are shown in fig. 1. The slope of the isoprofit curve passing 
through the general point (qi, y) is: 
41 =0 
Fig. 1. 
q, =’ 
(8) 
The family of curves of constant expected utility, U = CJO (constant), is 
shown in fig. 2. The fact that q1 enters linearly into the expected utility 
function, through the probabilities, imparts additional structure to these 
indifference curves. 
It is apparent that, for workers, the tradeoff between salary and probability 
of layoffs, while not discontinuous, is qualitatively different on either side of 
the indifference curve 7-J =u(b, 0). At this critical level, the salary is such that 
the utility of after-tax income with h fewer hours of leisure is equal to the 
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/ 
u f, f- tly, h) 
= ulb, 0) 
t 
4,‘Q q, =q 
Fig. 2. 
utility from the UI benefits; workers are then indifferent to the possibility of 
being laid off. At any higher level of U, and correspondingly of y, a lower 
layoff probability comes at the expense of a lower salary when employed. 
This tradeoff is reversed at levels of U <u(b, 0), where the combination of 
wage rate and disutility of working is such that a temporary layoff is 
preferable to working. 
The configuration of the indifference curves suggests that the nature of the 
change in contract terms, in response to an exogenous change, may depend 
on whether the initial (ql, y) position is above or below the critical level, 
where u((l- t)y, h)=u(b,O). (Compare the contracts labeled A and B in fig. 3.) 
With this in mind, we define an endogenous measure: 
z(y b t) ~ ~((1 - ~1~2 4 - 4b> 0) 
> 7 (1 - tb,(U - QY> 4 ’ 
which can be interpreted as the utility gain, in equivalent units of pretax 
income, from being employed rather than temporarily unemployed. 
Equivalently, Z(y, b, t) is defined to the first-order approximation by the 
condition 
u(( 1 - t)(y -Z), h) = u(b, 0). (9’) 
The contract space can be partitioned according to the sign of Z, as 
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Y 
A 
9, =o 
Fig. 3. 
q,=l 
indicated in fig. 3. The slope of the indifference curve passing through the 
general point (ql, y) is: 
ay 1,z 
aql u =-~,+~,q,’ (10) 
At an optimum, the common marginal rate of substitution of y for qi for the 
firm (MRSJ and the workers (MM,) is therefore: 
MRS, = - ;1 3 MR&, (11) 
as implied by (5b). 
While contracts with Z>O (working is ex post preferred to being 
temporarily laid off) are more likely to be the normal case, there are reasons 
for taking seriously the possibility that a contract might be such that 2~0. 
First, the state of layoff unemployment being considered here is a temporary 
one. It is in the nature of a paid vacation, without the stigma or disutility 
that attaches to a permanent job loss. That such spells of unemployment 
might be more attractive than working is evidenced by the inverse seniority 
provisions often observed in contracts, whereby the option of being 
temporarily laid off is to be offered first to the most senior workers. 
Furthermore, Feldstein (1978) has presented a representative calculation 
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which indicates that the net income loss from unemployment can be very 
small and easily outweighed by the value of leisure. 
There is another tendency favoring 2~0, which has implications for the 
provision of UI and may, paradoxically, make Z<O a less likely occurrence. 
If the UI benefit, b, could be set optimally by the firm and workers, it would 
satisfy (7). If other features of the UI system are unchanged, in particular the 
fact that benefits are untaxed, (7) implies that the optimal b, b*, satisfies: 
u,(b*, 0) -=c u,U - GY, N. (12) 
Therefore, if ui2 50 (marginal utility of income does not decrease as leisure 
increases) it must be the case that b* > (1 - t)y and so u(b*, 0) > ~((1 - t)y, h); 
thus Z(y, b*, t)<O. We shall make further use of this fact in the analysis 
below. 
If the UI scheme were private, so that e= 1 and benefits were taxed at the 
rate t, then (9) implies that the optimal private benefit, 6, satisfies: 
u,((l-t)6,O)=u,((l-t)y,h). (13) 
Again it follows that if u12 50, then 6> y, so that ~((1 - t)6, 0) > ~((1 - t)y, h) 
and therefore Z(y, 6, t) < 0. 
So it would be ex ante optimal for a private UI scheme to provide a UI 
benefit in excess of the wage and therefore workers would prefer being laid 
off to working. On the other hand, such a state is not ex post preferred by 
the firm; layoffs have zero productivity but are more costly than continued 
employment. There is thus an incentive for the firm to agree to such a 
contract (we show below that the wage is likely to be lower than if the UI 
benefit were smaller) but then conceal a shortfall in product demand in order 
to avoid layoffs. This moral hazard problem may explain in some degree the 
prevalence of government intervention in the provision of UI. 
The complete picture of the contract choice is obtained by combining figs. 
1 and 2, although it is immediately apparent that the precise form of the 
resulting configuration depends on the location of the ridge line, y = pi G’(q,) 
+ eb in fig. 1, relative to the horizontal indifference curve, u(( 1 - t)y, h) = u(b, 0) 
in fig. 2. In other words, the ‘contract curve’ or optimal contract set, defined 
in part by the tangencies of indifference and isoprofit curves, will depend on 
all those exogenous factors influencing profit or utility. When workers are 
risk averse, a typical contract curve is shown as CC’ in fig. 3. Risk neutrality 
on the part of workers straightens CC’ into a vertical line, so that relative 
bargaining strength is reflected solely in the wage. (Formal derivatives are 
given in the appendix.) 
The tangencies determining optimal contracts occur with a negative or 
positive slope according as Z is positive or negative. The sign of Z is 
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endogenous, however, and depends in particular on how large an expected 
profit II* is achieved by the firm. Ceteris paribus, higher values of II* are 
associated with lower wages and smaller (or more negative) values of Z. So 
while the chosen contract might imply Z ~0, and therefore be such that 
workers would benefit from a temporary layoff, this does not signify a 
general ‘preference for unemployment’. Workers would rather have a 
contract that implies Z>O and, accordingly, a preference for being employed 
rather than laid off. Note also that it does not follow from the condition 
Z<O that workers will be able to bribe the firm to lay them off. At an 
optimum [see (ll)] the net gain to the firm from employing an additional 
worker (piG'- y + eb) is exactly equal to the net loss (-Z) that would be 
received by that additional worker. (Indeed, as observed above, ex post the 
firm then has an incentive to conceal the occurrence of a state entailing 
layoffs.) A fortiori, workers who have been laid off cannot bribe the firm not 
to rehire them in the event that the higher state of demand occurs. 
4. Wage and layoff responses 
If there is any change in the economic environment, the set of optimal 
contracts will change. There will be a new (U*, ZI*) possibility frontier and 
the contract actually selected will depend on the bargaining solution 
adopted. Without specifying the latter, the effect of a parameter change 
cannot be made precise even if the initial position is fixed. If it is assumed, 
however, that the final contract will reflect a Pareto change (i.e. will not be 
such as to make one party better off and the other worse off, relative to the 
initial position) then the actual change will be intermediate between the 
changes consistent with a constant U* and a constant II*. So we analyze the 
contract response for both of these alternative conditions. 
The effects of a small parameter change on employment and the wage are 
completely described by the comparative static derivatives for problems (3) or 
(4). But it will be useful to set out in geometric terms the consequences of at 
least one parameter change, particularly since one outcome of the analysis is 
the ambiguity of some responses. In general terms, the considerations are 
these. A parameter change will affect one or other of the families of level 
curves (indifference curves in the case of t or b, isoprofit curves in the case of 
pr, e, b or T). For the affected family, not only will the corresponding 
marginal rate of substitution at each point be different (except in the case of 
T), but so also will be the level curve identified with the maintained (H* or 
U*) constraint. The ultimate effect on q1 or y can be determined by a 
comparison of marginal rates of substitution at appropriate points. 
For later reference, we collect here some general properties of these 
marginal rates of substitution. It follows from (8) and (10) that, in the vicinity 
of an optimal contract, the marginal rates of substitution of y for q1 for the 
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tit-m (MRS,) and for the workers (MRS,) vary with y and q1 according to: 
;(MRS,)=,: ;; q 
0 1 1 
l-(l-;;llz , 
1 
(16) 
(17) 
making use of (11). [Here and henceforth, to simplify expressions, u1 and ull 
are understood to be evaluated at ((1 - t)y, h) unless otherwise stated, and G’ 
and G” are evaluated at ql.] It follows that the differential rates of change of 
MRS, and MRS, with respect to y and q1 are given by: 
$(MRs,-MRS,)= -A 
0 
;f, (lpuyll, 
1 1 
which has the sign of Z when ull ~0, and: 
~(MRS~-MRS,)=~ plG” < 0, 
1 0 
which is independent of Z. 
As noted above, these relative rates of change are potentially crucial 
determinants of the net impact of an exogenous change. Observe that, in the 
y-direction, the sign of the rate differential depends on Z and the magnitude 
is directly proportional to the measure of workers’ absolute risk aversion 
(-(1 - t)ui,/u,), a characteristic of the utility function. In the q-direction, by 
contrast, the magnitude of the differential depends on the rate of change of 
the marginal product of labor, a property of the production function. The 
magnitude of each differential can thus be altered, no matter what the initial 
optimum, by the specification of parameters in the utility and production 
functions, respectively. This fact underlies the occasional ambiguity that will 
be shown to exist in comparative static effects. 
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4.1. Product demand conditions 
Consider first the effects of a change in product demand conditions. Suppose 
there is an increase in pr, i.e. the lower state of demand is increased. When 
Il* is the maintained constraint, the situations before and after the change 
are as illustrated in fig. 4(a) for the case of a contract with Z>O, and in fig. 
4(b) for the case of Z<O. With an increase in pr, l7* is associated with a 
higher isoprofit curve (IZ:) than initially (II,*), since the firm can afford a 
higher wage for any given layoff probability. The horizontal and vertical 
Y 
YI 
(W 
Fig. 4. 
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shifts (OA and OB) are derived from the differential of the isoprofit constraint 
(5d): 
OB=dy &G 
.S7*=o=&+J41 dp, (19) 
The net effects on y and q1 are determined by comparison of MRS, and 
MRS, at A and B, respectively. Specifically: 
and 
aY 
-SO as 
MRSt$ MRS;, if Z >O, 
aP1 MRSt$ MRS& if Z ~0, (20) 
a4r -SO as MRSE$MRSg, if Z>O or Z<O. 
apr 
From (11): 
$WS:)=-I “:a4 <o. 
1 0 1 1 
So, together, (15), (17), (18) and (22) yield the condition that: 
20, if Z>O 
$0, if Z<O. 
This is confirmed by the comparative static derivative, 
ay 4 
~=~[ZG’+p,GG’I, 
where 
lB~=I,Z”(l-u~ll +(A,+A.,q,)p,G"<0. 
Thus, 
if ZjO, 
if Z>O. 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
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The sign of ay/dp, depends on that of ZG’ +p,GG” or, equivalently, 
q,Z/p,G(q,)/q,G”(q,)/G’(q,), i.e. it depends on the magnitude of the 
elasticity of the marginal product of labor in state 1 relative to the ratio of 
the money value of employment (Z) to the money value of the average 
product of labor in state 1. Alternatively, the sign of dy/dp, is that of 
GG”q, zq, 
-G’(G-q,G’)-p,(G-q,G’)’ 
which is the difference between the inverse of the elasticity of substitution 
and the ratio of the money value of employment to those who are, to the 
money value of competitive profits. 
Similarly, combining (14), (16) and (19), we find that: 
aql 
-SO as 
aP1 
-(;,,+&q,)G’+il(l -;;‘IZGyO. 
This is confirmed by the comparative static derivative, 
aq1 1 
-=- 
ah IB( -(&,+~lql)G’+E~l(l -:;“” 1 . (24) 
Thus, 
if ZZO or u11- -0, 
if Z-CO and u,,<O. 
The sign of dq,/dp, is that of 
q1G’ ___ 
G 
which is the difference between the employment elasticity of output in state 1 
and the product of terms involving the money value of employment to those 
who are and the worker’s absolute risk aversion. 
The response to a variation in product demand conditions is quite 
different, however, when U* is the maintained constraint. Then the situations 
before and after a change in p1 are as illustrated in fig. 5(a) for a contract 
with Z > 0, and in fig. 5(b) for Z < 0. 
In the case Z>O it must happen that y and q1 move in opposite 
directions, whereas in the case Z-CO they must move in the same direction. 
Everything is determined by how MRS; changes with pl, which is negatively, 
according to (22). So, if Z > 0, then i?y/ap, < 0 and dq,/ap, > 0; while if Z < 0, 
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(4 
Y 
(Z<O) I , 
0 7 , / * / 
(b) 
Fig. 5 
then ay/ap, ~0 and dq,/~p, ~0; i.e. 
ay -20 as Z$O 
dP1 
and 
!!L>O 
aP1 ’ 
for any Z. 
These conclusions are confirmed by the comparative static derivatives: 
(25) 
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Comparing the optimal adjustments to a change in demand conditions 
under the alternative maintained constraints, it is seen that there are 
potential conflicts between the firm and the workers with respect to the 
qualitative (as well as quantitative) nature of the desired adjustments. In 
particular, starting from a contract with Z>O, the firm wants to respond to 
an increase in product price by lowering the wage (and increasing 
employment), whereas workers may prefer an increase in the wage (together 
with an increase in employment). On the other hand, starting from a contract 
such that Z<O, the firm and workers will agree that the wage should 
respond positively to an improvement in product demand conditions but 
they may disagree on the employment response. The potential for 
disagreement in this latter context, it is worth noting, does not exist unless 
workers are risk averse. 
The general picture that emerges from these comparative statics results is 
one in which an improvement in product demand conditions creates a desire 
for increased employment, on the part of both the firm and the workers, but 
no systematic tendency for wages. Taking a large but tentative leap to the 
macro level, this could be viewed as suggesting that product demand 
fluctuations are likely to be accompanied by procyclical fluctuations in 
employment but relatively stable wages.2 
The preceding analysis of the effects of product price on wages and layoffs 
illustrates the potential importance of three essentially different 
considerations: 
(i) the choice of maintained constraint or bargaining solution; 
(ii) the nature of the initial conditions, as characterized by the sign of Z; 
and 
(iii) the presence or absence of risk aversion. 
These factors have a bearing on the effects of changes in every parameter of 
the present model. 
4.2. Income tax rate 
A change in the income tax rate alters the workers’ indifference curves but 
not the isoprofit curves. Thus, if I7* is the maintained constraint, the 
‘Employment and wage behavior in fluctuating product demand conditions is the central 
focus of McDonald and Solow. They also conclude, for structurally similar reasons, that demand 
fluctuations tend to produce correlated employment fluctuations but no systematic movement in 
real wages. 
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necessary adjustment in y and q1 will take place around the unchanged L’* 
curve. The directions of change for y and q1 are then the same or opposite 
according as the contract is one with 2 ~0 or Z > 0. The directions in either 
case are determined by the effect of t on MRS, at the initial contract 
position. This is given by 
i.e. 
(27) 
Since, from (5b), it is always the case that Z-y < 0 at an optimum, MRS, 
unambiguously decreases with t when Z>O and hence, in this case, the 
changes in y and q1 are respectively positive and negative. If Z<O, however, 
the effect of t on MRS, depends, from (27), on the difference between the 
workers’ relative risk aversion and the percentage gap between the wage and 
the money value of being employed. So long as the workers are not risk 
neutral, there will therefore be potential ambiguity in the responses. 
These conclusions, when II* is the maintained constraint, are confirmed by 
the comparative static derivatives: 
dY &Z ZYU11+Z-Y 
Y%=m 7 ( 4 l-t 
and 
: 
20 as ZZO, 
= to, if Z-CO and ull=O, 
(3 if Z<O and u,,<O, 
a41 ~o+hq1 
-=- 
at IBI ( ZYUll +z-Y Ty l-t 1 
CO, if ZZO or u11- -0, 
= 
PX if Z>O and u,,<O. 
(28) 
(29) 
If U* is the maintained constraint, the new optimum is a tangency of 
different indifference and isoprofit curves. The analysis of the change, in 
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terms of marginal rates of substitution, is given in the appendix. The results 
are summarized here in the comparative statics derivatives: 
aY 
-’ i,,z ~ z-pq [ ( ZYUll +z-Y Ul l_t +(&+h)PlG~‘& 1 1 (30) 
=-I >O, if ZZO, (‘99 if Z<O. 
The potential ambiguity observed when ZZ* is maintained (with both Z <O 
and uir < 0) is reinforced here by the term involving the second derivative of 
the production function, which is basically unrelated to the terms involving 
utility and income. However, 
a’q1 
-= 
at -&)+i,q,)~<o. IBI 
without ambiguity. 
4.3. Unemployment insurance 
It is generally regarded as a plausible proposition that unemployment 
would be reduced by either an increase in a firm’s experience rating or a 
decrease in the level of insurance benefits. An increase in experience rating, 
ceteris paribus, makes layoffs more expensive for the firm; a reduction in 
benefits, ceteris paribus, makes the unemployment state less attractive to the 
workers. It will be shown here that, in the context of the present model, a 
negative relationship between layoff unemployment and experience rating 
obtains except, possibly, in a situation that might well be regarded as the 
most typical. On the other hand, there is no prevalent relationship between 
benefits and layoffs. Wages are found to be negatively related to benefits but 
not systematically influenced by experience rating. 
4.3.1. Experience rating and taxes 
Consider first the effects of a change in experience rating, holding Ii’* 
constant. Let U(e, b) denote the maximum value function for problem (3) 
and let a caret (A) indicate values associated with an optimal contract. A 
standard result yields: 
d We, 4 
-= -A,(1 -ij,)b(l- t)u,((l- t)j, h), 
de 
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which is negative. Thus, ceteris paribus, the expected utility of workers 
attached to a given firm will be increased by a reduction in that firm’s 
experience rating. It does not follow from this, however, that a reduction of e 
is an appropriate policy, since a reduction in UI contributions by one firm 
must be compensated for by an increase in contributions of other firms 
whose workers correspondingly suffer a loss of utility. Only if e= 1 for all 
firms is there no cross-subsidization. 
The optimal contract configurations before and after an increase in e are 
illustrated in fig. 6(a) (case Z> 0) and fig. 6(b) (case Z ~0). Comparisons of 
MRS, and MRS, at the critical points (detailed in the appendix) show that 
Y 
(‘4 
Fig. 6. 
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employment in the second state will rise, remain constant, or fall according 
as 
or, equivalently, 
[_‘I -$%q 
~l(l-ql)z~(~o+~lql)Y~ (33) 
i.e. as the product of workers’ absolute (respectively, relative) risk aversion 
and expected money value of the utility loss due to layoffs is less than, equal 
to, or greater than expected employment (respectively, expected wage bill). It 
follows from (33) that an increase in experience rating might lead to an 
increase in layoffs if (and only if) both Z>O and uil ~0. We shall return to 
this point below. 
Similar considerations show (see the appendix for details) that if Z>O the 
wage will fall as e rises, while if Z <0 the wage will rise, remain constant or 
fall according as 
Zz(1 -ql)plG”. (34) 
The ambiguity of response in this case can be seen by elaborating the right- 
hand side of (34). When Z<O, the wage change will depend on the sign of 
(G-q,G’). (-GG”qA 41(--Z) 
G G'(G-q,G')-(1 -ql)plG" 
which is the difference between the ratio of the competitive share of capital 
to the elasticity of substitution and the ratio of the money valuation of 
employment to the competitive wage times the proportion unemployed. 
The precise effects of a small change in experience rating, with II* held 
constant, are given by: 
ah b 
-= __ 
i3e IBI i,(l-q,)Z(l-t)ul,+(~o+I,q,) Ul 1 (35) 
>O, if ZSO or uii=O, 
= 
(% if Z>O and u,,<O, 
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and 
!!!=Q [Z-(1 -ql)plG”] 
ae IF 
(36) 
! CO, if 220, = (?), if ZtO. 
The most interesting among these results is the effect of experience rating 
on layoffs when Z>O (i.e. in situations where workers prefer to be working 
rather than laid off). A major conclusion of Feldstein’s (1976) analysis, in 
which Lr* = 0 is the maintained constraint, is that expected employment will 
increase with an increase in the firm’s experience rating, since the UI subsidy 
to the firm would be diminished. The preceding results demonstrate that, 
without Feldstein’s assumption of risk neutrality, this conclusion need not 
hold. It will be shown next, however, that regardless of the degree of 
workers’ risk aversion an increase in the firm’s experience rating will 
definitely lead to fewer layoffs if U* is the maintained constraint. On these 
grounds a negative correlation between experience rating and layoff 
unemployment can be more confidently accepted as the prevalent tendency. 
Since e is not a parameter for the isoutility curves, a change in e when U* 
is maintained involves a movement of (qt, y) around the given U* curve. The 
changes in q1 and y will therefore be opposite in sign for contracts with 
Z >O, and of the same sign when Z ~0. Since MRS, declines when e rises, 
independent of Z, it follows that employment will rise with e regardless of 
the sign of Z; the wage will decrease when Z >O, increase when Z < 0. The 
precise effects, when U* is held constant, are given by: 
ah 
---~ 
de 
-~(io+J.,q,)(l-t)z4,>0 
IBI 
and 
g=$(l -t)uiZz 0 as Z$O. 
(37) 
Combining the two sets of results (Li’* constant and U* constant) it is seen 
that increasing experience rating tends to reduce unemployment but has no 
clear impact on wages. This conclusion parallels that for the effects of 
changes in product price, with employment appearing more responsive than 
wages, but the macroeconomic implications are less obvious here. 
Experience rating is effectively nonexistent for those firms whose reserve 
ratios lie outside a specified range. Such firms are taxed at a flat rate, i.e. e 
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= 0 and T > 0. The effects of a change in T (as, for example, with a change in 
the maximum or minimum UI tax rate) are easily derived since only the 
family of isoprolit curves is affected, and then only by a relabelling of the 
curves. The contract curve does not shift. It is therefore immediate that, if U* 
is maintained, an increase in T will have no effect whatsoever on layoffs or 
wages; the firm’s profit will be reduced by the amount of the increase. 
On the other hand, if II* is the maintained constraint, a change in T is 
equivalent to an equal change in II* and therefore results simply in a 
movement along the contract curve. Recall that the contract curve is vertical 
when workers are risk neutral and positively or negatively sloped, according 
as Z > 0 or Z < 0, when workers are risk averse. In either case, a change in T 
results in a change in the wage in the opposite direction. With risk neutrality 
there is no effect on employment (as when U* is maintained). When there is 
risk aversion an increase in T results in fewer layoffs if Z ~0, but more 
layoffs if Z > 0. The increase in layoffs due to an increase in a lump-sum tax, 
occurring in the ‘normal’ circumstances of workers’ risk aversion and 
preference for being employed rather than laid off, is likely to be an 
unforeseen consequence of upward shifts in the UI tax schedule. 
4.3.2. Unemployment benefits 
A priori, determination of the effects of a change in the level of the UI 
benefit is more complicated than for any of the other parameters, in the 
sense that only b influences both indifference curves and isoprolit curves. The 
potential for indeterminacy is therefore increased. Indeed, as will 
below, the effects of benefits on layoffs is not independent 
considerations even when initial conditions have been well chosen 
a precise determination of the response. 
When b is a parameter and Z7* is the maintained constraint, 
effects on layoffs and wages are given by 
a41 1 
-= __ 
o”b IF4 l,(l-q,)eZ(l-t)U,l-(lo+~,q,)f Ul 1 
and 
ay 
z= -f$ CZf+e(l -ql)plG”], 
where 
u,@, 0) f=~(y~b~e)~(~_t)u,((~_t)y,~)-e~ 
be shown 
of other 
to permit 
the local 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
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Furthermore, the maximum value function responds according to: 
dU 
~=1.1(1--41Ml -h((l -tb, 4. (42) 
It is evident that the directions of these responses depend on the signs of 
both Z and f: 
Consider first what would happen if b were a contract choice variable 
rather than a parameter. [Although, in the following analysis, we continue to 
suppose that b is untaxed, the principle and the essence of the conclusions 
would be the same if b were taxed as regular income. If b were taxed at the 
rate t, for example, b would be replaced by (1 - t)b inside the utility function 
and (1 - t) would multiply the first derivative of the utility function whenever 
the marginal utility of b occurs.] Then an optimal contract is specified by a 
vector (y*, qy, b*) and clearly, for any given n *, the expected utility from this 
contract is greater than that from an optimal contract when b is a parameter. 
For this reason, in what follows we shall refer to b* as the optimal UI 
benefit. 
From the analysis of section 3 [see, in particular, eq. (7)] we know that 
u,(b*,O)-e(l-t)u,((l--t)y*,h)=O, (43) 
which implies that f(y*, b*, e)=O. It follows from (42) that, in the 
neighborhood of b*, f(y, b, e) 3 0 as b 5 b*. 
In section 3 it was also established that Z(y*, b*, t)<O. So for b in a 
neighborhood of b*, Z(y, b, t)<O and eqs. (39) and (40) then yield the 
following conclusions: 
aql ‘O, 
i 
if u,,<O, 
---z 
ab 
sgn (b-b*), if ull=O, 
and 
ay 
,,<o. 
Parallel conclusions follow when U* is the maintained constraint. The 
effects of the UI benefit on layoffs and wages are described by: 
&I1 1 
-_= -- 
& IBI [ ~lhdl -u)ull(l _t;l;;;O)t)y Ul 9 h) --u.+;,Ylv] 
JPE-B 
(44) 
350 K. Burdett and B. Hool, Layoffi, wages, and unemployment insurance 
and 
u,(b> 0) 
(45) 
In a neighborhood of b*, then, as before: 
841 >o, if u,,<O, 
-= 
ab 
sgn (b - b*), if uii=O, 
and 
ay 
,,<o. 
So the desired responses of firm and workers are reinforcing. At this level, an 
increase in benefits results in a lower wage and, if workers are risk averse, 
fewer rather than more layoffs. Only if workers are risk neutral and the 
benefit level is below the optimum will the conventional prediction of an 
increase in layoffs be justified. 
In practice, the legislated UI benefit only partially replaces lost wage 
income, i.e. b < (1 - t)y. If additional leisure enhances the utility of 
consumption (ui2 SO) then, since the experience rating factor is bounded 
above by unity, it follows from (41) that f >O. It is then apparent from (39) 
or (44) that the response of employment to a change in the UI benefit is 
potentially affected by the combination of two factors: whether or not there 
is risk aversion (uii <O) and whether the initial contract is such that Z>O or 
Z < 0. Specifically, when f > 0: 
aql CO, if ZZO or u,,=O, 
-= 
ab 
(‘3 if Z<O and u,,<O. 
Thus, when workers are risk neutral (the Feldstein case) or when working 
is ex post preferred to a temporary layoff, a reduction in the UI benefit will 
result in fewer layoffs. In order for the reverse effect to occur when f > 0, it is 
necessary that there be both risk aversion and an ex post preference for 
being laid off. In these circumstances, as can be seen from (39) and (44), 
aqJt?b increases (it is more likely that layoffs will rise when b is reduced) 
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with the workers’ absolute risk aversion. Finally, from (40) and (43 when 
.f>O, 
dY 1 <O, if ZSO, a6= (3 if Z>O. 
Thus, a determinate wage response tends to occur when the employment 
response is indeterminate, and vice versa. 
It is worth noting explicitly that the objectives of reducing temporary 
layoff unemployment and making the workers under contract better off, are 
not necessarily harmonious. Changing b away from b* reduces the workers’ 
utility but may be what is required in order to reduce unemployment. 
5. Summary 
We have investigated the microeconomic influence of unemployment 
insurance on wage and temporary layoff behavior, using a two-state model of 
optimal labor contracts that encompasses the pertinent features of the 
models of Azariadis (1975) and Feldstein (1976). At a formal level the main 
distinction from these lies in the analytical approach. Instead of treating the 
contract problem from the point of view of either the firm or the workers, we 
consider these as dual problems and allow the contract to be selected from 
the optimal set according to some bargaining rule or process. The possible 
responses to any change in the economic environment are then delimited by 
the respective dual solutions. 
The set of contract choice variables, when the UI parameters are 
exogenously specified, is shown to reduce to the wage (which will be state 
independent) and the probability of employment in the state with layoffs. The 
configuration of the set of optimal contracts (the contract curve) is then 
derived from the characteristics of the families of indifference curves and 
isoprofit curves. The key observation here is that the qualitative nature of an 
optimal contract, and thus potentially of the response to exogenous change, 
depends on the sign of a measure (Z) of the equivalent money value of being 
employed rather than temporarily unemployed, taking into account the UI 
benefits and additional leisure. In addition to the empirical evidence that Z 
might be negative, we demonstrate that an optimal contract would imply a 
negative Z if the level of unemployment benefits were a choice variable (as in 
the case of private UI schemes). We also show that this feature of (ex ante) 
optimal contracts may generate moral hazard and in turn lead to 
government intervention in the provision of UI. 
Our results concerning the direct effects of both experience rating and the 
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UI benefit level raise some questions about the general validity of the 
conventional wisdom. We show that, without the assumption of workers’ risk 
neutrality, Feldstein’s (1976) conclusion that layoffs would be reduced by an 
increase in experience rating does not necessarily hold. The same is true of a 
reduction in the UI benefit. But we do also show that a negative correlation 
between experience rating and layoff unemployment is supported by a 
consideration of the bargaining context, and that a positive relationship 
between layoffs and the UI benefit level is likely to obtain in the empirically 
relevant circumstances. 
The other parameter of the UI system is the lump-sum tax, which becomes 
operative when the firm is not experience rated and is subject to UI tax at a 
flat rate. A change in this tax, as would.result from any vertical displacement 
of the UI tax schedule, tends to result in a wage change in the opposite 
direction. If workers are risk neutral there is no incentive for any layoff 
response. But if workers are risk averse there will be a layoff response and it 
is likely to be perverse: if workers prefer employment to temporary layoffs, 
an increase in the lump-sum UI tax will result in more layoffs. 
When the product price changes, reflecting a change in the lesser state of 
demand, both the firm and the workers will typically seek a positively related 
change in employment. On the other hand, there is no prevalent tendency in 
the wage response. The latter is sensitive to initial circumstances and to the 
resolution of bargaining conflict. Considering these results in the longer term 
context of a succession of such contracts, there is at least a hint of the 
macroeconomic consequence that product demand fluctuations are likely to 
be accompanied by procyclical fluctuations but relatively stable wages.3 
Appendix 
Comparative static derivatives are based on (5a) and (5b), taking b as a 
parameter, y>O and O<q, < 1 (hence vi =O), together with either (5d) when 
the expected profit constraint is maintained, or (6) when the expected utility 
constraint is maintained. For each maintained constraint, the system reduces 
to a pair of equations: 
Z+p,G’(q,)-y++b=O, (AlI 
and either 
~,poG(l)+~.,p,G(q,)-_(~o+~tq,)y--~eb(l --4+ T=n* 
or 
(~O+~lql)u((l--)y,h)+~l(l-ql)U(b,O)=U*. 
‘See footnote 2. 
642) 
(A3) 
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The total differentials of (Al)+A2) and (Al)+A3) yield, respectively, the 
systems: 
G’dp,--fdb+bde+ 
I /Z,Gdp, -A,e(l -ql)db--A,b(l -q,)de-dT-dill* (A4) 
and 
B = 
where 
G’dp,-j-db+bde+ 
AU - 41) 1 
Ul 
u,(b,O)db+(I,+I,q,)~dt+~ (1 -t)u, dU* 
and 
Shape of contract curve (see section 3) 
From (A4): 
aY 
-= IBI an* 
--ip,G"<O 
and 
ah 1 z(l--t)%l 
I 
20 as Z$O, if u,,<O, 
-=-m u1 an* 
=o, if Ull’O. 
Alternatively, from (A5): 
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and 
?&hZ$ 
r 
$0, as _Z$O, if u,,<O, 
=o, f u,,=o. 
Effect of income tax rate, with expected utility constant (see subsection 4.2) 
When U* is the maintained constraint, the situations before and after an 
increase in t are as illustrated in fig. 7(a) (case Z > 0) and fig. 7(b) (case Z < 0). 
U* is associated with a higher indifference curve (U:) than before (U,*), since 
workers require a higher before-tax wage for any given layoff probability. 
The horizontal and vertical shifts (OA and OB) are derived from the 
x 
q, 
(b) 
Fig. 7. 
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differential of the isoutility constraint (6); 
&+4q, y 
21 (1 -t)Z dt7 1 (‘46) 
647) 
The net effects on y and q1 are determined by a comparison of MRS, and 
MRS, at A and B: 
aY -50 as 
MRSA 5 MRSA ur “, if Z>O, 
at MRSfj$MRSi, if Z<O, 
and 
~$0 as MRS;$MRS& for Z>O or Z<O. 
at 
From (11): 
Together, (15) (17) (A6) and (A8) yield the condition that: 
280 as 
3 Z-Y +ZYUII 
20, if Z>O, 
20 +*;I41 l-t u1 
$0, if Z<O. 
so 
ay >O, if Z>O, 
t= 
1 (3 if Z<O. 
Similarly, (14), (16) and (A7) yield: 
Since Z-y < 0 at an optimum, aq1/i3t < 0 regardless of Z. 
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Effect of experience rating, with expected profit constant (see subsection 4.3.1) 
The analysis of an increase in e parallels the preceding, with the situations 
illustrated in fig. 6(a) (Z> 0) and fig. 6(b) (Z >O). The horizontal and vertical 
shifts of the II* curve are derived from the differential of (5d): 
W - qJ 
OA=dq, = -~ 
dIZ*=O z ’ 
OB=dy = _&W-q,) 
The net effects on y and q1 are given by: 
aY -SO as 
i 
MRSfizM&Y$, if Z>O, 
ae MRSA g MRSA Cl< n, if Z<O, 
and 
g$O as MRSE$MRSi, if Z>O or Z<O. 
From (11): 
$(MRS,,)= -A ::” ql. 
0 1 
(A9) 
(AlO) 
(All) 
Combining (15) (17), (A9) and (Al 1) yields: 
Thus, aY/LJe < 0 if Z > 0, and aY/& has the sign of (1 - ql)pl G” - Z if Z < 0. 
Similarly, (14), (16), (AlO) and (Al 1) yield: 
%$O as i,(l-q,)Z (1 -t)u,, +(i,+&q,)$O. 
Ul 
Thus, aq,/ae>O if Z<O or uI1= 0, but there is ambiguity when Z>O and 
Ulj <o. 
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